Are USBs safe to store veracrypt hidden volume? : OpSec | Torhoo darknet markets

There isn't a big difference in "secure" for the most part. If the data is an encrypted volume, then it's encrypted on both. The problem is more that when you try to erase data, SSD's do not erase data as reliable as an HDD does.

I guess you reference to /post/2cdfe96a1d5ef3139d44/#c-0e4c84464f3d7e189e
USB flash filesystem has the same issues as any SSD.

What makes the assumption in the first part of your post?

Wear leveling and data deletion don't add any more security since the containers are encrypted in both cases.

Using a Veracrypt hidden volume correctly and safely, is much more complicated than it seems. Please read the Veracrypt manual online and follow all of its precautions. It isn't just flash storage like SSDs and flash drives that could be a problem, it's forensic artifacts left behind on operating systems too. Either of those could give big clues that you actually have a hidden volume. That being said, I've never actually heard of a forensic lab proving someone was using a hidden volume.

As a cryptographer, if my threat model included needing a hidden volume, here's what I would do if I wanted to store a hidden volume on an SSD/flash drive:
1. Create and view a hidden container ONLY on a live operating system such as TAILS. This helps prevent forensic artifacts.
2. I would only use this to store data but I would not edit the file container once it's been placed on flash storage. Therefore there is only 1 non-changing file container on the flash storage device, preventing problems associated with editing it on such storage.
3. If you need to edit the container, you can't really. Instead, make an entirely new container on the live operating system with whatever changes to the data you need.

Read the documentation and think about if your threat model truly requires such precautions.