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2. is indirectly stating that of their administrator was, now defunct, the node.moneroworld.com. There is an unknown amount of other Chainalysis administrators around the world running the poisoned nodes for them now.
4. To counter the adversary that is collecting all available metadata from your transactions, - use as much obfuscation as possible.
- use Tor to frustrate
- while using your own node, you will utilize the Dandelion++
- but note that the metadata are visible on the Monero blockchain and will be utilized against yourself (see our example of the combined attack below)
- mix Monero properly
Joe sits at home and connects to Tor from his home router. He believes this is not an issue, because in his country the Tor is not illegal. He opens up his Monero wallet and connects to the Monero remote node, waits for the sync from the remote node and once ready, he sends the transaction to his business partner as usually....
....Chanalysis is monitoring his transactions closely and can identify and track down high percentage of his transactions and link them together. They can see the exit IP of his transactions is the Tor exit node, because by using the Monero remote node he cannot utilize the Dandelion++ feature and sends the transaction directly to the poisoned remote node and the node knows this is the real exit IP address.
Tor is not offering the message padding or mixing. The packets flow through the network in a precise order and this attack is utilized very well.
- To counter this just don’t connect to Tor from any IP that is linked to your real world identity. If you are deanonymized (and you occasionally are deanonymized), you are fucked directly.
Q: are you saying that node.moneroworld.com is/was run by Chainalysis? As well as all of the remote nodes that used to be listed on the site?
Q: what is Dandelion++? Is it implemented automatically when someone runs their own node?
Q: what metadata? And is this metadata visible publicly even when running your own remote node?
Q: is mixing necessary or advisable even when running your own node? (If so, why?)
Q: This is where I'm especially confused. Are you saying that using Tor to connect to nodes (e.g. in MoneroGUI) doesn't fully de-anonymize the traffic because a number of exit nodes are controlled by state actors? Are Monero transactions that use nodes routed through Tor any less anonymous than regular traffic in the Tor browser? I'm just not clear exactly what you're saying or what the implications are for transactions on Monero or traffic on Tor itself.
Q: Last, is there any way to tell what previous transactions may have been compromised?
Everyone should read this.
You actually don't really need much money to be in the club. You just need the right connections or be able to offer the right benefits to the right people by them knowing you.