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Complete SSD wipeout, 0% traces/chances for recovery : OpSec | Torhoo darknet markets

Does anyone have any suggestions regarding a tool or method to completely nuke all SSD data leaving absolutely no traces or possibility for recovery? I want to do a complete wipe out and do a fresh install Qubes or Ubuntu. I don't have the means to purchase a separate dedicated device at this point my current setup is Windows 11 OS with dedicated Nvidia RTX 3080 gpu, basically a gaming pc..I no longer have the time to play video games and eventually will probably end up getting something more compatible for that purpose. Which also brings me to another question..are there any compatibility issues that i should be aware of that are potentially going to cause issues running this setup and if so are there any workarounds that wouldn't be too difficult to implement for it to work? Does using incompatible/partially compatible hardware or the workaround methods/software that are required to make it all work pose any risk to compromising my security/anonymity? Sorry for so many questions..I appreciate any and all suggestions or links to relevant information. Thank you.

/u/Silent_Cal P

3 points

3 weeks ago

For real, man, just trash it with a hammer and get a new one.

/u/svenne

1 points

3 weeks ago

Valid

/u/twinhermits 🍼

1 points

3 weeks ago

You can always wipe the drive with the Linux 'dd' command before you install. Note that quality / modern SSDs generally have "wear leveling", so they shift data around, and keep a stash of unused portions of the memory for future use. Those portions / blocks may have old data on them, or they might be quickly wiped out. I don't know which brands / models wipe quickly or not.

This data is not normally accessible to the user, but with a firmware backdoor, a firmware hack, or a careful disassembly and re-wiring of your drive, someone with access could theoretically read data from there. If your original data was encrypted, then there's a good chance that it's unrecoverable once you get the block that contains the encryption keys wiped. I'm not sure about UEFI-level encryption with the TPM though, that might still retain keys to decrypt arbitrary blocks. I'm sure that there are other complexities with Windows machines / PCs.

Note that it's generally not needed to write zeros to the drive multiple times, because aside from the above caveats, the first time should wipe the data that is written to SSDs and spinning drives. When it comes to writing random data, that is not always necessary, but can be useful to write to disk to give some plausible deniability for why there is random data on your drive, so you might get away with saying that it doesn't have encrypted data. Note that there are easy ways to break that pattern, like mounting drives with the 'discard' option / using the 'fstrim' comand, which will automatically blank out unsed blocks. Then the encrypted blocks of data that remain in comparison are harder to pass off as random data. Keeping unused random blocks, and selling that story could be pretty hard, so I don't know if it's worth it to try that.

But also you have to think of the threat model... are you afraid that your Ubuntu install will get hacked, without having access to an additioal backdoor for your drive? If so, it can't read your old unencrypted data if you wipie it with 'dd' first.

/u/breakingyoshi 📢

1 points

3 weeks ago

Ahh..I see thank you for the advice. I'll figure something out one way or another.

/u/twinhermits 🍼

1 points

3 weeks ago

Presuming that you're already committed to removing the data, if you run `lsblk` on Ubuntu, you can see info about your drives, internal and external. Choose the right one based on partitions, sizes, etc, and unmount all of its mountpoints. If there are software RAID devices, LVM, or other data often found on a drive for Linux, you would have to close those too. Since it's a Windows drive, it won't have LVM, and probably no software RAID setup.

If it's /dev/sdx, run (Yes, it's 'umount', missing an 'n' after the 'u'):

sudo umount /dev/sdx*
lsblk # check that nothing is still mounted for that dirve
sudo dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdx bs=16M oflag=sync status=progress

You should see the progress with the data wipe. When the command finishes by running out of space, partition the disk in Ubuntu (or any distro's) installer.

/u/[deleted]

1 points

3 weeks ago

Drill a hole into it

/u/Dreadnautilus

1 points

3 weeks ago

Large operations, particularly with highly sensitive data, will actually have thermite charges placed in/around the drive to complete destroy the data if necessary. Its possible to retrieve data if its not completely destroyed. Even if unlikely, its possible. You need to figure out for yourself if your threat model makes that a necessity.

Weigh the techniques pros and cons for yourself. If that data would put you away for a decade? Might be worth making damn sure it doesn't see the light of day. On the other hand, if you bought small amounts off of a DNM or whatever, maybe a full wipe with the 'dd' command will suffice. It looks like /u/twinhermits has an excellent response with plenty more information for you to make your decision.

/u/breakingyoshi 📢

1 points

3 weeks ago

Yeah it was just some retarded decisions that i've made breaking a lot of secret rules of opsec so prob gonna go with 'dd' for now as you said but i was planning on expending into riskier ventures in foreseeable future so it might be a good idea to start thinking about implementing more stringent protocol as well as physical distraction of said hardware..are there any hardware besides my storage medium that i should be worried about like are hardware id's a thing can they become an issue and become an issue linking me to my past activities? Can they be modified? Will my MAC address change after i switch over to Unix based system automatically or should i look for tools to have that changes as well?

/u/twinhermits 🍼

3 points

3 weeks ago

One thing to remember is to encrypt as much as you can, not just your home directory, but the root filesystem too. Depending on the hardware, you would probably leave /boot/efi/ unencrypted. The encryption doesn't protect you from attack when the computer is running, but it does help if a thief steals your laptop when it's turned off or the screen is locked, and tries to get your data later.

/u/Dreadnautilus

1 points

2 weeks ago

Sounds good to me. As far as anything else to worry about. Like /u/twinhermits said in their reply, definitely encrypt it. Always encrypt everything you can. And the password should be a long phrase you have memorized. A full paragraph if you can. Other than that, I guess it depends on what youre going to do, how you have the computer set up etcetera. Id recommend you do your own research on it and come to your own conclusions. Its the only way to really be sure. And you dont want to get balls deep and be paranoid second guessing yourself. Some paranoia is a good thing, but when it takes over... things slip by. Dont let that happen. Good luck to you!

/u/asfaleia ⚔️ασφάλεια⚔️

1 points

3 weeks ago

Turn you SSD into a dust. Disperse the dust into an ocean. Complete SSD wipeout, 0% traces/chances for recovery ensured 100%.

/u/alwaysfire

1 points

3 weeks ago

The best and only real way to do this, is to fully encrypt it (veracrypt suggested), and then throw away the password, and erase it from your brain. But event that is not a perfect means of erasing it. If it was an HDD, it would be different, but with SSD's, its impossible to fully erase all data. The best solution is to smash it with a hammer and then throw it in a fire.