Deniability - Where to hide your Monero Wealth ? : OpSec | Torhoo darknet markets
⚠️Link to the tutorial⚠️
Hi everyone, in this tutorial we explore where to effectively store your wealth in monero, in a deniability setting. (meaning we cover how to ensure that your funds are still accessible by you alone even if your devices were to be seized and if you were to be forced to unlock encrypted volumes)
That setup made possible only because of the previous sensitive VM tutorial i wrote
⚠️Sensitive VM tutorial⚠️ (in order to enable long-term sensitive use, since you need to store your monero wallet somewhere)
As usual,
⚠️constructive criticism⚠️ is welcome, let me know if i missed anything
(Pt 1 of response, see Pt 2 in reply)
Small nitpick. XMR should be used for plural "Moneros" as to keep with conventions.
Could be more on topic here. But the information on carry amounts is good
for background and trivia. Being forced to unlock a device will depend on the region, but it always a good assumption to make.
The United States has its fifth amendment which is sufficient against soft
agencies. In other places or depending on the adversary encountered, you may be imprisoned for the existence of an encrypted volume, and/or the enhanced techniques will be used to extract the necessary intelligence pertaining to the volume from the subject. The adversary does not only look at hard drives and USB keys.
They will seize absolutely every and all storage mediums during the
federal law enforcement raid. This includes spare floppy drives and DVDs. They will also have people look through your bookshelves and drawers for paper books and note books and skim through them as well. I cannot speak for every country and their practices, some are more thorough than others.
Minor nitpick, lose instead of loose. It is a seed phrase, not a seed node.
While I am correcting these minor typos, I would like to say that I do not
want you to resort to using an LLM to "improve" the writing of the guides.
That would turn the guides into AI slop writing as opposed to this natural writing and is much less desirable. No other issues.
I do not know why you think this is an unlikely scenario. It has already been done and to a high degree of success. Not specifically targeting Haveno, but acting as a malicious peer for transacting cryptocurrency to fiat and vice versa. Some historical reading material on this subject can be found with the search term "Operation Dark Gold". More recently I have discovered with absolute certainty that there is a current operation using FBI online employees on Telegram offering to provide fiat to cryptocurrency in the mail. Malicious peers and services are an ongoing problem and a real threat. Thankfully some of the federal agencies (or their employees at least) and associated vermin involved in these practices, while displaying okay trade-craft and general employment of various humint tactics during interactions, they fail to prevent certain leakages associated with running their operation)))). But I am getting slightly off-topic.
Some things I would recommend include the following. Store the backup(s) off-site. The backups are useless if all discovered, seized and formatted. The average Dread user are likely not equipped to properly conceal backups within their own home. Another thing I do not see mentioned is a good but very, very simple practice to be used when unlocking volumes and dealing with sensitive information that is password protected in general. The humble piece of fabric should be used to cover the keyboard and screen whilst dealing with the encryption password. I will use a real world example to demonstrate its effectiveness. When Edward Snowden arrived in Russian Federation, he brought with him a heavily encrypted laptop that was likely believed to contain important and useful intelligence. As part of his efforts to prevent the extraction of the contents of his laptop, he made use of two simple yet very effective techniques: The first was to remain effectively glued to his laptop at all times. Not once was it left out of his sight. The second, the usage of the simple cloth to cover over himself and his laptop during the decryption process. This made multiple soft techniques useless, including but not limited to making hidden cameras intended to capture footage of him entering the passcode useless, and the inability to covertly implanting the laptop with a keystroke logger to obtain the encryption key. There are other methods of extracting the necessary intelligence, but it effectively neutered multiple first line soft techniques.
I see a link provided to the backups process you prescribe which is good. I have not looked through it yet so I am not sure of its full contents. But if it does not cover the creation and usage of hidden volumes from the start then it should.
Overall, it is a solid tutorial. The Dread community should appreciate such quality guides as found on your website. But you should rethink your notion that dealing with a malicious actor while laundering the cryptocurrency is unlikely as this is an incorrect and fatal notion.
yeah i covered that in the "sensitive data backups" tutorial : ⚠️link to the tutorial⚠️ with the recommendation of using VPSes to store the veracrypt container to. due to only accessing those vpses through tor and form the sensitive VM itself, the adversary can't tell which vps you connected to, to save your data
> The humble piece of fabric should be used to cover the keyboard and screen whilst dealing with the encryption password.
yea in the other tutorial regarding ⚠️veracrypt hidden volumes⚠️ i mention that the hidden volume password is to remain secret at all costs, which implies that you're not typing it unless if you've made sure you're alone in the room. That may not cover the unlikely eventuality of a camera hidden behind you while you're typing it, but i think it's unlikely enough. (my general blog advice aims to cover 99% of the risks for 90% of the people out there, imo that's the last 1% of risks)
> But you should rethink your notion that dealing with a malicious actor while laundering the cryptocurrency is unlikely as this is an incorrect and fatal notion.
yeah i'm changing that accordingly, thanks for the feedback
will fix it, thx. yea i know i'm guilty of typos every now and then. (i'm never using LLMs to write blogposts however, thank god.)
> I do not know why you think this is an unlikely scenario
will fix that aswell