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Does restarting Tails do anything? : OpSec | Torhoo darknet markets

I am using Tails with Persistence, always. I have two different accounts on the same site (like a DNM) that are supposed to be different identities. I care to log in on different times to not leave a pattern or anything. As well as disabling JS etc so I'm aware about the basics.

Now, does it make any difference if I restart my Tails (followed by unlocking Persistence again, connecting to internet and Tor again etc) when I switch from one account to the other? Or is just a new Tor identity (and some time in between) the exact same thing?
/u/datarape
2 points
3 weeks ago
Restarting Tails does provide some additional isolation beyond just requesting a new Tor identity, but it’s not a silver bullet.

When you restart Tails:

Your session memory and any temporary files are wiped clean. This reduces the risk of residual data or malware lingering between sessions.

Unlocking your Persistence and reconnecting to Tor starts a fresh OS environment, which helps separate the two accounts better than just switching identities within the same session.

However, if you reuse browser fingerprints, device settings, or patterns of behavior, restarting alone won’t fully prevent correlation.

In contrast, just getting a new Tor circuit (new identity) in the same session keeps the same OS environment, browser state, and possible fingerprinting attributes, which can be linked together by advanced adversaries.

Best practice for separating accounts:

Restart Tails between sessions to reset the environment.

Use separate Persistence volumes if possible, to keep identities fully isolated.

Disable JavaScript and minimize any features that could leak identifying info.

Vary your browsing behavior and timing to avoid behavioral correlation.

Consider using separate physical devices or live USBs for truly high-risk compartmentalization.
You must re-start Tor Browser when shifting from one account to another. Otherwise cookies are not removed. This is what "New Tor identity" do.

Rebooting Tails is an extra protection, uptime, files in Downloads, DNS content, or other o/s features could potentially interconnect your alts if Tails is not re-started.
/u/macro1771 📢 🍼
1 points
3 weeks ago
Thanks! Do you think this could be significant if not restarted? Unfortunately I am not sure what you mean by uptime, DNS content or other OS features, I'm not an expert on this but would like to learn more.
In general a Tor Browser re-start is enough. But, to increase the isolation between the accounts, an o/s re-start is more safe. The mentioned features are only examples on what an site could try to do.
/u/macro1771 📢 🍼
1 points
3 weeks ago
Okay. What cases could lead to detecting a connection between the identities due to not restarting Tails?
I'm writing about leaks, they are 0-days or fooling user to do something that reveals more metadata. It's not something generic and basic.
If you are interested in this, see /d/Hacking
In an ideal state - 1 identity = 1 Tails dongle.

If you use 1 Tails for more than 1 identity, any bug reveals the connection. But if you (for some reason) use it this way, always restart the Tails between using the another identity.

Restarting Tails will erase the RAM from the previous session and it creates (with high probability) different Tor EntryNode and circuits.