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Feds seized eXch infrastructure and stole 34 million euros : Monero | Torhoo darknet markets

Following the recent incident involving a North Korean-affiliated hacker group stealing funds from Bybit, several DEX and swapping services faced significant pressure.
As a result, everyone's favorite swapping service eXch announced a change in ownership. Subsequently, after receiving an anonymous tip, on April 17th they revealed plans to shut down, ultimately ceasing operations on April 30th. Read more here https://torhoo.cc/go.php?u=TDNCdmMzUXZOakF5WVRjMk9EWTVZMlk0WXpjeU9EWTVZVE09#

Today, 10 days after the shutdown, German and Dutch authorities (BKA/FIOD) announced the seizure of eXch infrastructure and most of its funds. However, there are no strong indications that they have identified the operators or gained access to off-chain transaction data.

The web page eXch [.] pw is still accessible, while the .onion displays a seizure banner. It seems that the .onion has been seized, but not the clearnet?

The following is pure speculation:

The key question now is how they managed to steal the 34 million euros, which constitutes the majority of eXch's reserves? A few possibilities come to mind:
a) It's likely that the funds were taken from eXch wallets associated with centralized exch.anges like Kraken. The eXch operators may have made a mistake by using these centralized exch.anges to convert their reserves into Monero. A more effective strategy could have been to exch.ange all their customers' Monero for traceable currencies at a discount, which might have helped avoid the loss of 34 million euros. Were they perhaps too rushed? Why attempt to exch.ange so much at once?
b) It seems likely that they also seized the backend infrastructure along with all associated wallets. This suggests they gained access not only to open blockchain data but also to wallet data, which could lead to user transactions being linked. However, why would the eXch operators keep their coins in the same wallets after the shutdown?
c) It's possible that they arrested the operators and gained access to all data. I find this unlikely, as such information would typically be included in press releases, and it doesn't make sense for the operators to give up access to the encryption keys so quickly.

Now the pigs resort to their typical fear-mongering tactics on BitcoinTalk, just as they did here on Dread before:
To users of the recently dismantled cryptocurrency exch.ange,

*****This message is issued by the Dutch Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD) and the Bundeskriminalambt (BKA).

The service has been taken offline as part of our enforcement action.

We are actively investigating individuals involved in money laundering and other illegal activities through this swap service.

Some question actions from law enforcement regarding crypto services. We want to make one thing clear: this action is not an attack on privacy. We respect the right to privacy and recognize its importance in the digital age. However, when services are heavily abused to commit crime, we will act.

We urge everyone involved in illicit activity to cease immediately. The legal consequences can be serious. Our mission is to protect the integrity of the financial system and hold those who exploit it accountable.

Privacy is not the problem - criminal misuse is.

Sincerely,

FIOD and BKA

I find this part particularly funny: "Our mission is to protect the integrity of the financial system [...]"
They are surprisingly honest about their role in defending the corrupt and exploitative financial system.
Remember boys, "Privacy is not the problem - criminal misuse is."

Full press releases here:
https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/DE/Kurzmeldungen/250509_eXch_abgeschaltet.html
https://www.fiod.nl/bka-and-fiod-shut-down-cryptocurrency-swap-service-exch-e-34-million-in-cryptocurrency-has-been-seized-during-the-operation/
By the way, it is filled with misinformation, including the claim that eXch has been operating since 2014.
/u/greenpirate
1 points
2 months ago
does it mean that if you have a huge stack of lets say (litecoin) from exch that you must concider it as dirty coins? will coins from exch be flagged?
/u/Stronger 📢
2 points
2 months ago
It was likely that LTC and BTC coins from a mixed pool would be flagged as 'dirty' even before this.

eXch aggregated ETH and some of their BTC (aggregated pool) in an address marked as theirs in chain analysis systems, which worked for a while. The LTC and BTC (from the mixed pool) were simply transaction outputs sent by other customers. These could have been clean coins sent from an exchange or flagged coins from a hack.

Either way, consider your LTC to be tainted now.
/u/greenpirate
1 points
2 months ago
ok thanks,that was what i thought
/u/greenpirate
1 points
2 months ago
is there a way to find out if crypto is tainted?
/u/Stronger 📢
1 points
2 months ago
Yes, the simplest way is to send a small amount through a swapper, although it will not provide you with much information.
There are also services that resell chain analysis companies' APIs from time to time.

Additionally, there is AMLBot, which is used by Russian swappers, but I would not recommend it. The operators of AMLBot are scum, and, funnily enough, they will lower the trust score for your addresses for using their Telegram bot.
/u/DrugMahal
1 points
2 months ago
AML Bot works fine with Telegram.
Through the telegram app you can request a report about any wallet. Simply fill in the wallet address and an AML report will be generated. You have to pay small fee for the report but you DO NOT have to connect your wallet. Any app that asks you to connect your wallet for an AML report is a scam and a drainer.
Again you just fill in the wallet address in the AML Bot on telegram and a report will be generated in minutes.
/u/Stronger 📢
1 points
2 months ago
AMLBot is a scam. Ever since Elliptic terminated their access, their risk scores have been basically made up. It might be useful when dealing with Russian swappers, since they rely on AMLBot as well. However, most international swappers use Chainalysis, Elliptic, and others, making AMLBot of no use.
To add for completeness of /u/Stronger answers. You can take a look at the crypto AML risk percentages guide /post/d4252cb91d5619bb4bd3/ it would give good rough indication depending on where your coins come from what AML score to expect. Anything above 20-25% usually gets asked for documents and additional verification.
/u/enzyme P
1 points
2 months ago
[removed]
/u/jackFAGroberts
1 points
2 months ago
[removed]
/u/Tre
1 points
2 months ago
North Korea doing too much
/u/MaxPayneUK
1 points
2 months ago
Didn't they close too due to pressure and still got hit? rip.
/u/RootedWTF P
1 points
2 months ago
Purely speculating here about the seized funds:
The operators likely stored private keys unencrypted in hot wallets on their servers. Or they did something stupid, like store a seed phrase on it.

We’ve seen this all before, far too many times. It’s because users are so fucking lazy to make the effort of using a P2P or trustless swaps. General mentality is “but I can exchange directly on {insert custodial platform here}.”
/u/pimp2go
1 points
2 months ago*
Does this mean addresses which were used to receive funds from exch are now flagged by feds?
/u/Stronger 📢
1 points
2 months ago
It would be safe to assume that.
/u/root P
1 points
2 months ago
What is exch[.]pw? I only ever saw their signed domains as being exch[.]cx and exch[.]net?
/u/Stronger 📢
1 points
2 months ago
It is one of their official domain names, and .cx redirects to .pw in an attempt to preserve their best-known domain name.
/u/jackroberts
-1 points
2 months ago
Exch/cx should have never tied a clearnet domain to their backend servers. this was absolute mistake. they made several other Opsec mistakes. I can't go over all of them here. They could do it like /d/infinityproject is doing.
/u/Stronger 📢
1 points
2 months ago*
The absolute mistake was anything that led to 34 million being seized stolen and operators possibly identified. It is theoretically possible to operate a clearnet service anonymously. Without a clearnet service and an offshore company, they would not have been able to grow. Infinity is handling peanuts compared to eXch while facing similar risks.
/u/jackroberts
1 points
2 months ago
ANY clearnet domain and its underlying infrastructure can be taken down by LE agencies. you can operate a clearnet domain anonymously but you can't prevent its seizure. Also I mentioned they had other opsec mistakes.
Infinity will grow little by little, don't forget that exch started back in 2014. so don't compare apples with oranges.
/u/Stronger 📢
1 points
2 months ago
Please list their OPSEC mistakes instead of teasing us.
Anonymously purchased clearnet domain being seized is not an OPSEC risk, it could be considered a business risk.

They didn't start in 2014. Someone tried to create a swapper named 'eXch' in 2014, but it was shut down. It was then 'relaunched' in September 2022, likely by different operators. In less than a year, they became the biggest service that used their own liquidity reserves.

It's a much younger service than Infinity, and there are multiple reasons why Infinity or Majestic never took off. Best of luck to them, nonetheless
/u/jackroberts
1 points
2 months ago
Well I think even average joe would know that if you set up a service online, that swaps millions of dollars of crypto for entities like Lazarus or DPRK, to name a few of course, you would become a target for western intelligence agencies. that's for sure. I am not affiliated with any swapping services but I sometimes check them. and in exch case it was clear they would be taken down.
/u/Stronger 📢
1 points
2 months ago
Please list the 'several other OPSEC mistakes' eXch made. The BKA and FIOD know, but we do not.
By your logic, running a no-KYC swapper is a mistake in itself, as it could be used by DPRK at any point.
I think you do not understand what OPSEC is.
/u/jackroberts
1 points
2 months ago
>>Please list the 'several other OPSEC mistakes' eXch made
1_using a cleanet domain,
2_not using a CDN/proxy,
3_not shielding cryptocurrency nodes, they were directly broadcasting TX to other nodes.
4_connecting your Tor hidden service to your clearnet infrastructure, using the same servers for both services.
5_not setting up VanGuards for your Tor hidden service.(probably)
6_using german dedicated servers.
7_not separating crypto nodes on separate servers, this makes seizure of all wallets at once pretty easy.
8_getting in touch with Ethereum and monero crypto currency developers teams and asking them for help compiling from source and then blaming them for their incompetence.
9_being physically located in a country like germany.
10_writing on bitcointalk forum that you will cease operation in 3 weeks because intelligence agencies are coming after you. if you think they are coming after you, you should cease immediately. why in 3 weeks?
>>The BKA and FIOD know, but we do not
I am not affiliated with BKA or any other agencies, but with a simple probing of their website, I figured out many opsec failures,the german IP was visible,they claimed they contacted monero dev team, I even wanted to contact them to tell about these issues. but who am I really? they know better.
>>running a no-KYC swapper is a mistake in itself, as it could be used by DPRK at any point.
it's not a mistake, but intelligence agencies will try to come after you. you must have a solid strategy even before you develop your project or register your domain. you can't learn Opsec after your project is already running. just telling the world:"we are doing this for the sake of privacy", will not hinder LE agencies. YOU MUST HAVE SOLID OPSEC IN PLACE. I respect all these people and their vision. but we don't live in a perfect world. some governments like the united states government will use tremendous force to achieve their goals.they are violent, they don't care about human rights at all. they don't care really about privacy. it's a sad world.
/u/Stronger 📢
1 points
2 months ago
1_using a cleanet domain,
It's not an OPSEC mistake in itself, but hopefully we will see more .onion only exchanges in the future.

2_not using a CDN/proxy,
They used an in-house proxy, which is better than the NSA-owned Cloudflare or the FSB-owned DDoS-Guard.

3_not shielding cryptocurrency nodes, they were directly broadcasting TX to other nodes.
That sounds like speculation to me, unless you actually verified it. I haven't.

4_connecting your Tor hidden service to your clearnet infrastructure, using the same servers for both services.
This one is false. It's interesting, but the .pw website is still up, while the .onion displays a seizure banner.

5_not setting up VanGuards for your Tor hidden service.(probably)
Sounds like speculation to me.
A few months ago, a big DDoS attack targeted all swappers and eXch held up well, so I would guess they had the technical knowledge.

6_using german dedicated servers.
The fact that they likely used DE and NL servers is a problem. Few countries have better teams for seizing servers than DE and NL.
We must consider that eXch were looking for providers that offer dedicated bare metal servers that could be manually encrypted. Unfortunately, it seems that this did not work out.
By the way, considering their conflict with the Russian oligarch-owned WhiteBIT, AMLBot, and BestChange, it is likely that had their services been identified in a CIS country, the outcome would be the same.

7_not separating crypto nodes on separate servers, this makes seizure of all wallets at once pretty easy.
That sounds like speculation to me, but obviously, they somehow messed up in this regard.

8_getting in touch with Ethereum and monero crypto currency developers teams and asking them for help compiling from source and then blaming them for their incompetence.
There's nothing wrong with that. Ethereum nodes are notoriously unreliable. Also, props to them for compiling the software themselves.

9_being physically located in a country like germany.
There’s nothing to suggest this. It’s unknown whether the operators have been identified. It seems that at least some of them were from Russia or Ukraine.

10_writing on bitcointalk forum that you will cease operation in 3 weeks because intelligence agencies are coming after you. if you think they are coming after you, you should cease immediately. why in 3 weeks?
I agree, in this case, the graceful exit turned out for the worse.

Obviously, they messed up in some way, but you portray them as complete novices, and I do not think it is that simple.
/u/DaVenom
1 points
2 months ago
Awful design, or better expressed as there was no design, just happy hacking.
/u/Stronger 📢
1 points
2 months ago
He is making it up as he goes, most of that is not true.
/u/Stronger 📢
1 points
2 months ago
Reposting, as my comment is currently 'pending moderation'.

1_using a cleanet domain,
It's not an OPSEC mistake in itself, but hopefully we will see more .onion only exc.hanges in the future.

2_not using a CDN/proxy,
They used an in-house proxy, which is better than the NSA-owned Cloudflare or the FSB-owned DDoS-Guard.

3_not shielding cryptocurrency nodes, they were directly broadcasting TX to other nodes.
That sounds like speculation to me, unless you actually verified it. I haven't.

4_connecting your Tor hidden service to your clearnet infrastructure, using the same servers for both services.
This one is false. It's interesting, but the .pw website is still up, while the .onion displays a seizure banner.

5_not setting up VanGuards for your Tor hidden service.(probably)
Sounds like speculation to me.
A few months ago, a big DDoS attack targeted all swappers and eXch held up well, so I would guess they had the technical knowledge.

6_using german dedicated servers.
The fact that they likely used DE and NL servers is a problem. Few countries have better teams for seizing servers than DE and NL.
We must consider that eXch were looking for providers that offer dedicated bare metal servers that could be manually encrypted. Unfortunately, it seems that this did not work out.
By the way, considering their conflict with the Russian oligarch-owned WhiteBIT, AMLBot, and BestChange, it is likely that had their services been identified in a CIS country, the outcome would be the same.

7_not separating crypto nodes on separate servers, this makes seizure of all wallets at once pretty easy.
That sounds like speculation to me, but obviously, they somehow messed up in this regard.

8_getting in touch with Ethereum and monero crypto currency developers teams and asking them for help compiling from source and then blaming them for their incompetence.
There's nothing wrong with that. Ethereum nodes are notoriously unreliable. Also, props to them for compiling the software themselves.

9_being physically located in a country like germany.
There’s nothing to suggest this. It’s unknown whether the operators have been identified. It seems that at least some of them were from Russia or Ukraine.

10_writing on bitcointalk forum that you will cease operation in 3 weeks because intelligence agencies are coming after you. if you think they are coming after you, you should cease immediately. why in 3 weeks?
I agree, in this case, the graceful exit turned out for the worse.

Obviously, they messed up in some way, but you portray them as complete novices, and I do not think it is that simple.
/u/adjoiningairline
1 points
2 months ago
Damn, that's a comprehensive report. But especially number 10. I also think they should have shut down sooner and moved all their coins to a secure location immediately.
/u/sakamoto_kix
1 points
2 months ago
Backend traceability via clearnet was just one cut — but they bled from deeper wounds.

Exch rotated liquidity too slow post-April 17.
Some hot wallets stayed online after DNS propagation.

Infinity doesn’t fix the flaw. It delays detection — unless they decouple DNS triggers from wallet pings.

You’re right: this wasn’t about Lazarus. It was about latency.