HavenoReto or Open Monero? : Monero | Torhoo darknet markets

The minimum requirement of 0.35 XMR security deposit for sellers on OpenMonero is there to help cut down on spam offers. While it’s not really meant to fund an offer, you can still use it for that (or just fund the difference) as long as the buyer’s trade request is no more than the security deposit.

Both the seller and the buyer can cancel a trade request if they feel like the other person isn't trustworthy since no xmr is locked at this early stage. Right now, the seller is chatting with the buyer and checking out their reputation, looking at things like how long they've been registered and what kind of feedback they've received. Should all evaluations meet satisfactory criteria, the seller has the option to secure an arbitration bond utilizing either an internal wallet (security deposit) or an external wallet (such as Cakewallet, Moneroju, Feather Wallet, Monero CLI Wallet, etc.)

For big trades, the seller might choose to fund the bond from a separate external wallet to avoid any potential scams from the arbitrator right from the start. On the other hand, for smaller trades, its usually easier for the seller to just use the internal wallet (security deposit) for the bond. By allowing both types of wallets for funding, the platform strikes a good balance between keeping things liquid and secure.

If there weren’t an option for external bond funding, there's a chance that an arbitrator could run off with all the money. But because funding is done manually, it really cuts down the risk of good exit scams or bots locking up coins.


Let’s say we have 1,000 sellers, each looking to sell 50 XMR. On OpenMonero, sellers can get trade requests without needing to fully fund a sell offer (just 0.35 XMR is enough to show their sell offer in search results). But on Haveno, sellers have to lock 50 XMR upfront + 7.5 XMR security deposit before they can get any trade requests. This means all haveno sellers pretty much have to lock that funds, or they won't get any trades. Currently, OpenMonero possesses a total of 81,550 USD (1,000 sellers x 0.35 XMR x 233 USD). In contrast, Haveno holds an alarming 13,397,500 USD (1,000 sellers x 57,5 XMR x 233 USD), derived from the same number of sellers, which presents a considerable risk of potential exit scams.

NOTE: An openmonero arbiter can steal the externally funded bond from a seller once its in the pot, but he can't grab all the potential liquidity (50,000 XMR = 11,650,000 USD) in the market, unless, of course, every seller posts their arbitration bonds at the same time, which is statistically improbable.

Let us consider a scenario in which 10 sellers, each with a trade finalization time of 24 hours, sell their 50 XMR daily. In this context, openmonero would be able to execute an exit scam amounting to only 850 XMR (1,000 sell offers x 0.35 XMR + (10 sellers x 50 XMR bonds)). This figure represents a mere 1.7% of the total market liquidity, which stands at 50,000 XMR (11.65 million USD). On the other hand, with Haveno, it’s theoretically possible to steal all the liquidity, no matter how many trades happen each day.

In the four examples presented below, we shall assume an average trade finalization time of 24 hours, with XMR valued at 233 USD. It is important to highlight that an increase in the trade finalization time results in a greater quantity of bonds within the pot. The term "trade finalization time" refers both to the moment at which the bond is removed from the pot for transfer to the buyer's non-custodial wallet, as well as the duration for which it remains within the pot. Should we adjust the finalization time to 12 hours, the potential exit scam amount associated with the bonds would be diminished by 50% (unless, of course, every seller posts their bonds at the same time, which is statistically improbable)

Variables:
# bond = 50 xmr
# timeframe = 1 day = 24 hours = 86400 seconds
# trade finalization time = 24 hours = 86400 seconds
# exit scam factor = timeframe / trade finalization time = 86400 / 86400 = 1
# all arbitration bonds = sellers x bonds / exit scam factor


# sellers per day = 1
all security deposits: 350 xmr
+ all arbitration bonds: 50 xmr
-----------------------------------
total: 400 xmr x 233 usd = 93,200 usd = 0.8% of total liquidity (exit scam)


# sellers per day = 10
all security deposits: 350 xmr
+ all arbitration bonds: 500 xmr
-----------------------------------
total: 850 xmr x 233 usd = 198,050 usd = 1.7% of total liquidity (exit scam)


# sellers per day = 20
all security deposits: 350 xmr
+ all arbitration bonds: 1,000 xmr
-----------------------------------
total: 1,350 xmr x 233 usd = 314,550 usd = 2.7% of total liquidity (exit scam)


# sellers per day = 30
all security deposits: 350 xmr
+ all arbitration bonds: 1,500 xmr
-----------------------------------
total: 1,850 xmr x 233 usd = 431,050 usd = 3.7% of total liquidity (exit scam)


Self-custodial trade funding serve to significantly mitigate the risk of total liquidity being jeopardized at all times. The occurrence of exit scams is relatively low within this model. I have intentionally used a longer trade finalization time, which deviates from conventional practices. For instance, my most popular seller (https://localmonero.co/user/jmcabc2008) operates with a trade finalization time of 21 minutes. If we assume that a majority of professional sellers maintain a similar finalization time (lets assume one hour), we can reasonably conclude that the probability of exit scams is reduced by a factor of at least 24 in comparison to the aforementioned examples.
# exit scam factor = timeframe / trade finalization time

Now, let’s consider a more realistic average trade finalization time of one hour. We’ll also project a remarkable 1000% increase in the daily number of sellers compared to our earlier examples, as we envision a thriving platform with a vibrant trading volume, much like the success localmonero enjoyed in its prime.

Variables:
# bond = 50 xmr
# timeframe = 1 day = 24 hours = 86400 seconds
# trade finalization time = 1 hour = 3600 seconds
# exit scam factor = timeframe / trade finalization time = 86400 / 3600 = 24
# all arbitration bonds = sellers x bonds / exit scam factor


# sellers per day = 100
all security deposits: 350 xmr
+ all arbitration bonds: 208 xmr
-----------------------------------
total: 558 xmr x 233 usd = 130,091 usd = 1,12% of total liquidity (exit scam)


# sellers per day = 200
all security deposits: 350 xmr
+ all arbitration bonds: 416 xmr
-----------------------------------
total: 767 xmr x 233 usd = 178,711 usd = 1,53% of total liquidity (exit scam)


# sellers per day = 300
all security deposits: 350 xmr
+ all arbitration bonds: 625 xmr
-----------------------------------
total: 975 xmr x 233 usd = 227,175 usd = 1,95% of total liquidity (exit scam)

Woodsers response (haveno dev):

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5533743.msg65126603#msg65126603