How do I Know I'm Anonymous on Tor? : OpSec | Torhoo darknet markets
Hello everyone,
How can one's traffic truly be anonymous if people own Tor nodes? More specifically, I've heard that the FBI hosts many Tor nodes themselves. If governments are able to host the majority of Tor nodes themselves, woudn't they be able to easily trace traffic back to you? I don't understand the anonymity of Tor if peole have the ability to even partially track one's traffic. I appreciate any help!
Tor circuits can occasionally be deanonymized and expose the IP-address used. To avoid this you should consider how you connect to internet.
Best is to connect from a free WiFi at some dinner or coffe shop with no IT-security. Blend in with remote workers, students and tourist. Optionally use a Yagi-antenna to get some distance. Don't visit the same location for months. Only use cash, leave all personal devices at home (Bluetooth gadgets, mobile, airpods, etc.). This way you are very hard to spot, even if the Tor connection is deanonymized.
Other options are obscured connections from home. Something like Mullvad/DAITA/multihop or NYM/multihop/obscuring (new provider that is not battle tested).
Solid advice, especially on physical anonymity if the entry node sees your IP and that gets deanonymized, your whole chain is compromised. Public WiFi + no personal electronics = good physical OPSEC. Yagi/long-range antennas help even more in rural or sparsely populated areas.
That said, even well-funded adversaries like LE or intel agencies can't deanonymize Tor traffic at scale it’s targeted. They’d need to control or monitor both the entry and exit nodes, and even then, correlation attacks require precise timing, unique traffic patterns, or leaks on your end (like app metadata or bad OPSEC).
Tor's strength lies in statistical improbability it's not perfect, but it's resistant to untargeted dragnet surveillance. So long as you're not giving them a reason to focus on you, the system holds up under most threat models.
Agree re: NYM very promising mixnet-style project, but it’s early days. Still wouldn't recommend anyone rely on it solo for critical OPSEC use without serious testing.
What do you guys think about using a Graphene phone with mullvad as a wifi for connecting to PC with tails, new anon sim bought every month and ofc phone bought anonymosly as well ?
Understand thx, but still working as a tor connection, and has something changed in the last few months that makes sense using a vpn and Tor, last I knew was that it was better not to use VPN and Tor or unnecessary at least to use VPN's when using Tor ?
The issue these days is that LE has aggressively started to register all Tor users in many countries (maybe this has been ongoing for a long time illegally). Nothing special being registered as a Tor user, you will be one of millions.
However, by being registered the probability increase for having post inspected, increased chance to be selected for a "random" body scanning and swab tests at airports, etc.
If such increased probability for inspections are a problem, then it's better to consider hiding the Tor usage.
EDIT: using Mullvad, NYM or other advanced VPN solutions is not making things better due to the fact that the customers to these VPN providers have a high concentration of cyber criminals. For sure they will be registered as well...
Just don't trust any VPN cuz that'll get your ass pwned.
Ideally you do collect some intel re: said place you want to siphon.
- If you feel really devious and cheeky you can deauth some noobs or just wait till customers leave to use their devices' MAC to continue their session time (if there's a captive portal).
If you feel extra clever you'll set it up as your "private exit"...
side question, if youre only ordering small amounts, is it really tht important to do all this stuff? like connect to a diff wifi than yours/ different places each time etc?
You main issue today are not APTs (Advanced Persistent Threat) on Tor. The main issue today is the cooperation of the ISPs and data exchange in between the intel agencies, historical and even in the real time.
The second simple vulnerability of Tor network is its geographical distribution of the Tor nodes. If you check the tor metrics, you can see that more than 50% of the Tor nodes are hosted in Germany and the US. So if those two share their national ISPs data, they get immediate access to the 50% of the Tor traffic. And they do share the data.
One of the studies showed that if one controls about 2% of the Tor nodes he can deanon more-less anyone. What about 50%? And with the Netherlands it is about 68% if I recall properly.
Tor doesn't have any message mixing and only limited connection padding (needs to be manually enabled), unlike NYM for example. Therefore it is fragile against some relatively easy attacks.
So, never ever connect to the Tor fro an IP linked to your RL ID. If your Tor fails, the attacker gets only some IP of the public, remote, crowded hotspot.
Best is to connect from a free WiFi at some dinner or coffe shop with no IT-security. Blend in with remote workers, students and tourist. Optionally use a Yagi-antenna to get some distance. Don't visit the same location for months. Only use cash, leave all personal devices at home (Bluetooth gadgets, mobile, airpods, etc.). This way you are very hard to spot, even if the Tor connection is deanonymized.
Other options are obscured connections from home. Something like Mullvad/DAITA/multihop or NYM/multihop/obscuring (new provider that is not battle tested).
See more at /post/f12b38fc9337bce6ae34
That said, even well-funded adversaries like LE or intel agencies can't deanonymize Tor traffic at scale it’s targeted. They’d need to control or monitor both the entry and exit nodes, and even then, correlation attacks require precise timing, unique traffic patterns, or leaks on your end (like app metadata or bad OPSEC).
Tor's strength lies in statistical improbability it's not perfect, but it's resistant to untargeted dragnet surveillance. So long as you're not giving them a reason to focus on you, the system holds up under most threat models.
Agree re: NYM very promising mixnet-style project, but it’s early days. Still wouldn't recommend anyone rely on it solo for critical OPSEC use without serious testing.
Ref: https://torhoo.cc/go.php?u=YUhSMGNITTZMeTlrYVhOamRYTnpMbWR5WVhCb1pXNWxiM011YjNKbkwyUXZNamt4TmkxMFpYUm9aWEl0ZEdoeWRTMTJjRzQ9#
However, by being registered the probability increase for having post inspected, increased chance to be selected for a "random" body scanning and swab tests at airports, etc.
If such increased probability for inspections are a problem, then it's better to consider hiding the Tor usage.
EDIT: using Mullvad, NYM or other advanced VPN solutions is not making things better due to the fact that the customers to these VPN providers have a high concentration of cyber criminals. For sure they will be registered as well...
Ideally you do collect some intel re: said place you want to siphon.
- If you feel really devious and cheeky you can deauth some noobs or just wait till customers leave to use their devices' MAC to continue their session time (if there's a captive portal).
If you feel extra clever you'll set it up as your "private exit"...