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Is using a custom bridge in Tor makes my OPSEC worse? : OpSec | Torhoo darknet markets

This is a question to folks that understand in OPSEC. I need to use a custom bridge, because my Tor usage can be considered as a suspecious in the country, where I live.

As we know, Tor Browser encrypts and bounces our traffic through three random servers before sending it to the public Internet. Is it still relevant when I am using a custom bridge?

Am I still secure if the custom bridge is compromised?
Custom bridges should only be used if you connect from a country that censors Tor connections. You risk to be very lonely in one and the same Tor bridge, it's way better to use connect to Tor directly, and if this is of some reason not viable use default bridges. Last options is custom bridges.
/u/OnTheEggshells 📢
2 points
2 months ago
Thank you for your clear direct response. But even if the Tor is allowed in my country, isn't it suspecious for investigators that I use it directly? They will easily get information from ISP that I often use Tor, won't it help them to support their case?
Correct, these days Tor users are registered, see /post/e548e5c8c11d7dec5c98/#c-71d4c1f193a558e0fa
/u/OnTheEggshells 📢
1 points
2 months ago
Interesting. Considering this info, can it be better to use default bridge in this case? Or even the custom one?
If you have worries, yes, a default bridge would give you basic stealth. Still, skip the custom bridges, thus you will use one and the same Tor entry for to long time. Secondly, custom Tor bridges are usually not crowded, and the Tor users there are mostly from countries where Tor is not allowed. This makes you stick out.

For other options, see post /post/f12b38fc9337bce6ae34
/u/OnTheEggshells 📢
2 points
2 months ago
Very informative, thanks again.

But I still have a question. Let's imagine that I use the default Tor bridge. Does my traffic still pass through three random servers (like it should be with Tor) and this Tor bridge is just an init point? Or the 3-servers rule doesn't work in this case?
Yes, your Tor traffic will bounce as usually, see the default Tor bridge as your Tor guard.
/u/dread_dead_head
1 points
2 months ago
If Tor users are registered, would it be better to connect to a VPN before connecting to Tor so that your ISP won't know you are using Tor?
Sorry for repeating my self.
For other options, see post /post/f12b38fc9337bce6ae34
A general recommendation is difficult. It depends on your specific threat model and jurisdiction. It should be assumed that state actors are able to recognize Tor traffic despite of using a VPN before connecting to Tor. But enhanced VPN technologies such as DAITA by Mullvad VPN should make network analysis more difficult.

You may also find this write up helpful: /post/1e03cc92f64e42c498fc

/u/DaVenom I appreciate you mentioned my post.

It should be assumed that state actors are able to recognize Tor traffic despite of using a VPN before connecting to Tor.

Actually this isn't true and information shouldn't be spread as such.

Though it says so in the Whonix documentation (whonix org/wiki/Bridges) which you've reposted, we shouldn't be taking everything at face value without verification. Correctly configured VPN will absolutely not show any activity within the VPN tunnel doesn't matter if Tor usage or not or if you're a state actor. Excluding cases where they would see the entire Internet then they can deduct but still not able to see directly within the tunnel itself.

To both you, OP /u/OnTheEggshells and /u/dread_dead_head I recommend reading the post /post/5f1ba84246ac7d2f386f

To add completeness to /u/DaVenom answer OP should too read comment /post/8714394170635447819a/#c-5c9547de6c55a598c6 discusses using bridges.
/u/retrodude
2 points
2 months ago
Both links were pretty good read mostly easy to understand thanks very much.
You're welcome for your message and I agree with you.

My intention was not to claim that Tor usage cannot be concealed by a VPN tunnel at all.

The research of the Whonix project* indicates that in certain cases and if certain adversaries are involved, it could be reasonable to assume that Tor usage could still be detected. We operate in an area where often no absolutely secure statements can be made. I suggest caution by considering multiple possible outcomes. This led to my mitigating expression.

Everyone should conduct their own research before making a decision about their setup.

*https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Introduction

My intention was not to claim that Tor usage cannot be concealed by a VPN tunnel at all.

I understand now what you meant. Perhaps you meant global rather than state actors? State would still have issue if you're utilizing OBFS4 bridge as explained in my original post such correctly configured bridges still work within China to escape the Great Firewall. Global on the other hand there are limited choices to bypass their view.


it could be reasonable to assume that Tor usage could still be detected. We operate in an area where often no absolutely secure statements can be made.

Global adversaries can certainly access more information and putting a VPN before or after Tor won't matter as such in a simplistic connection chain. Every situation is unique and I agree with you every person should do their own threat models as there isn't a one size fits all solution.
Yes, one could differentiate better between local/global adversaries, state actors and intelligence agencies.
/u/cognac
-2 points
2 months ago
You a cop or something spreading misinformation? Tor traffic is very distinct and makes no effort to disguise oneself. A determined actor can definitely see when you use tor when using a VPN. There are just not many actors who care about this.

Tor traffic is very distinct and makes no effort to disguise oneself.

No one is talking about using Tor directly. Did you bother to read the post /post/5f1ba84246ac7d2f386f at all before commenting?


Despite what is claimed under

[whonix org/wiki/Bridges]


Please note that it has been assessed as difficult beyond practicality to Hide Tor use from the Internet Service Provider with proxies, bridges, VPNs or SSH tunnels.



and the pure assumption (not based on any facts or research) from

[gitlab torproject org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#VPNSSHFingerprinting]


Once the premise is accepted, that VPN's and SSH's can leak which website one is visiting with a high accuracy, it's not difficult to imagine, that also encrypted Tor traffic hidden by a VPN's or SSH's could be classified. There are no research papers on that topic.



such attacks aren't practical against correctly configured VPN solutions. Although for anonymity reason (global adversary perspective) it wouldn't be recommend to connect VPN before Tor, if you have no choice or want to mask completely Tor usage, this can be the way.

Tor provides additional protections against this type of attack. Another note is when the research for these attacks had been presented it would come from adversary view of determining if you use Tor inside VPN [VPN(Tor)]. Nowhere did any researchers present concrete evidence or assumptions such adversary can leverage these attacks to see websites you'll visit within that encapsulated tunnel. Such would mean the VPN tunnel is broken beforehand.

Adding OBFS4 connection or going one step further and using only .onions would make Tor usage undetectable from any other VPN connection in the scenario of Tor inside VPN. Note again the circumvent vs hiding aspect.

Very clearly states and I actually outlined it in bold red letters again for you.

To be able to view and detect Tor usage within a VPN tunnel you need to have broken the encapsulation beforehand. Present any research or proof of concept saying otherwise. While it may be easier to detect if you're visiting a website while using VPN (but not Tor) for some variety of factors, when using VPN then Tor to visit websites those factors become irrelevant due to the nature of onion routing.

I'll say it once more don't blindly read and repeat stuff without verifying it.
/u/cognac
-2 points
2 months ago
Nobody asked you to repeat your misinformation again. DPI in properly encrypted encapsulated traffic can reveal many details. https://web.archive.org/web/20160309211413/https://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf You clearly did not read anything. You're just a cop.
/u/Yugong P I can move mountains ⛰️
3 points
2 months ago*

1
Awards Received
Bag of Sand
1
I can see based on your posts you enjoy being toxic to others. That's fine like guys who buy SUV you need to compensate who you are (or not) in real life no judging. What's not fine is talking without doing any reading beforehand.

On the other hand thank you I didn't think we'd see another asfaleia moment as soon /u/DaVenom /u/Beelzebub /d/Dreadmoments stock going up.


Nobody asked you to repeat your misinformation again

My so called misinformation had a direct quote from the Tor project website. I'll digest it for you to be fed in baby steps.

[gitlab torproject org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#VPNSSHFingerprinting]

Once the premise is accepted, that VPN's and SSH's can leak which website one is visiting with a high accuracy, it's not difficult to imagine, that also encrypted Tor traffic hidden by a VPN's or SSH's could be classified.
There are no research papers on that topic.


Did you notice the last sentence in big red enlarged text? No research papers on the topic.


DPI in properly encrypted encapsulated traffic can reveal many details.

DPI in properly encrypted encapsulated traffic can reveal many details? I've read it many times and the only solution I can say is to send your quote to /d/Dreadmoments for more stonks.

Do you understand what DPI is? How can DPI be in properly encrypted encapsulated (??) tunnel? For DPI systems to be able to read whats inside the VPN tunnel they must decrypt. You must be confusing it with corporate network systems whom in most cases are able to intercept most whitelisted connections and mostly because of CAs installed on devices.

You're making absolutely no sense but just being toxic for the sake of it. And making a fool out of yourself but based on your posts doesn't seem to be issue with you.


https://web.archive.org/web/20160309211413/https://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf


To begin with in what you referenced the word VPN is used only once and in passing. No research has been done on if you use a VPN.

Direct quote the linked research paper

Web privacy proxies, such as Tor and SSH, multiplex these
data transfers over a single, encrypted channel, so an at-
tacker can only see the size, direction, and timing of packets
in the multiplexed stream. Tor furthermore sends all data
in 512-byte cells, so packet sizes carry limited information.


Tor project has its own more detailed rebuttal against Website Traffic Fingerprinting Attacks take a look at blog torproject org/critique-website-traffic-fingerprinting-attacks/

Nowadays Tor not only has Tor Browser to minimize (not eliminate completely) the risk of specific website visits being fingerprinted but also Connection and Circuit level padding. They help against DPI in the beginning of the connection.


CircuitPadding 0|1
If set to 0, Tor will not pad client circuits with additional cover traffic. Only clients may set this
option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users for use where bandwidth may be
expensive. If set to 1, padding will be negotiated as per the consensus and relay support (unlike
ConnectionPadding, CircuitPadding cannot be force-enabled). (Default: 1)

ConnectionPadding 0|1|auto
This option governs Tor’s use of padding to defend against some forms of traffic analysis. If it is set
to auto, Tor will send padding only if both the client and the relay support it. If it is set to 0, Tor
will not send any padding cells. If it is set to 1, Tor will still send padding for client connections
regardless of relay support. Only clients may set this option. This option should be offered via the UI
to mobile users for use where bandwidth may be expensive. (Default: auto)


We've talked so far about Tor connections. My post /post/5f1ba84246ac7d2f386f actually deals with OBFS4 and detecting Tor connections from one of the best tools in world to do so Great Firewall of China. Adding OBFS4 bridge adds additional complexity for DPI systems on local level against Website Traffic Fingerprinting attacks as I've explained in there including options like IAT mode.

Now add all of that under a mathematically sound and well configured VPN. You can see the level of layered security in the manner. To claim you're able to break that chain and see end websites is absurd to say the least. For completeness sake I'll reiterate again going through VPN and then Tor isn't always the smartest choice from global adversaries but where you don't have a choice (China, Iran) it certainly isn't a bad choice.

You're able to break the VPN tunnel and then OBFS4 bridge, then magically view through the onion routing and finally tell us what websites are being visited? Prove it. Everyone always big fluff talk but no proof.

I believe this should be clear enough. Now son buy yourself a penis pump for that confidence and attitude and while you're at it ask your Dad how to respectfully talk to people.
/u/DaVenom /u/newbieforever2018 is this guy close to getting banned from the sub?
Perhaps banning should be a multi-step process in some cases such as:
1. warning
2. flair of shame
3. exit node
This was the warning :P
😎😎😎😎😎😎😎

I need an escalator emoji
🛗 Here's an elevator. It's as close as you'll get.

Ascii is better

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LOL. OMG that made me laugh. Thanks!
🕴_/▔

Not as majestic as /u/Beelzebub one but this you can put on flairs as one liner.
✅✅✅✅✅✅
That's cool. I like it. I've never seen it before.
No, we are good, some misunderstandings combined with a healthy dose of "do not trust anybody, especially not your self!"
If your bridge is compromised, you mean it is discovered as Tor Entry or it is under the control of the adversary?