My Opsec on Probation : OpSec | Torhoo darknet markets

Just use tails on a usb and anytime you think your po is coming just remove your usb off your computer and instantly itll be back to windows.

Brother I think you should use TailsOS.. That too runs on a pendrive and it neither uses the ram of your system. Once you unplug it their should be no trace of any activity their.. In tails you also have an option of persistent storage as well (Will be encrypted and saved in the pendrive for future use).

1. Buy USB
2. Install Tails w/ persistence
3. ???
4. Profit.

Man, don't do that cybercrime stuff during probation. Seriously. Just stick to legal cyber work like bug bounty hunting while you're still on it, and save the questionable activities for after the probation period is over

Dude, just exercise some self control, and stop fucking around with anything potentially illegal until you get off of the anal probe! That's the best way to be sure you don't get fucked. Then your freedom will be even more fun and exciting when it comes around.

Just my advice.

I’m on probation for a cybercrime offense and so my threat environment is basically my PO walking in on me while I’m using my laptop. I am allowed to possess a laptop, but I am obviously not supposed to be using tor browser, virtual machines etc etc. the specifics of this haven’t been discussed and never will be. My PO just assumes I use my laptop for school but I know at any point he may become inquisitive.

Your threat model is very different here compared to traditional cybercrime OPSEC, because it’s not just about staying hidden from the feds it’s about staying under the radar of your probation officer (PO) as well. That means you're under heightened scrutiny, and the moment your PO catches you doing something out of the ordinary, you're on the clock for a potential violation. Using Tor, virtual machines, or other tools will quickly raise suspicion. The best approach here is minimalism and stealth.

My host OS needs to be windows, for sake of looking like a normal person. I do not want to use Mac OS because that would imply I have extra $ and I don’t want give that impression. I would normally use Linux for my activities

This is a critical mistake. Windows OS is absolutely terrible for OPSEC, especially under the threat of feds. Even though you might be trying to look "normal," the reality is that Windows is a data-gathering machine. With telemetry, automatic updates, and all sorts of system level backdoors, using Windows as your host OS is a huge vulnerability. If your PO or LE ever gets curious, they can easily spot the traces of a compromised or "interesting" system. Windows is essentially a huge red flag for anyone who knows what to look for. Your threat model is the feds, and Windows is exactly what they want you to use it’s an easy point of entry for surveillance. You need a more secure OS.

My idea is to have normal Windows junk OS, but have small USB drive in which I run Puppy OS off RAM, with my persistence encrypted. My thinking here is if there is an unexpected visitor, I can unplug the USB while I’m logged in and program a killswitch in Puppy to initiate shut down if the USB becomes unplugged. The downsides to this is the need for a USB stick, and lack of ability to encrypt the entire USB drive. The pros are that since puppy runs in RAM, a sudden unplugging of the drive shouldn’t corrupt my files, especially with a killswitch.

The idea of using a live USB is interesting, but there are some critical flaws with it. First off, Windows is your host OS so it’s already compromised. Running a clean OS like Puppy on a USB drive won't help if your host system is full of telemetry, background services, and other vulnerabilities. Sure, Puppy may help you avoid leaving traces on your laptop, but the moment you plug that USB drive into the system, you’re relying on an inherently flawed setup. Your “Windows junk OS” is still the problem.

Also, your idea of using a killswitch to shut down when the USB is unplugged is not enough protection. If your PO or anyone else physically accesses your machine, they’ll still see the Windows OS running, potentially with key evidence like files, metadata, or cached data. This idea isn't robust enough for serious OPSEC, and the real issue here is the compromised Windows OS.

I was considering having regular dual boot on the laptop, but this is easily detectable by anyone with physical access to the device. I am not necessarily concerned about FBI level forensics, but a step just below that.

Dual booting on a Windows laptop is definitely a very risky move, especially when you’re dealing with a probation officer or even low level forensics. A dual-boot setup leaves traces behind. It’s not just about checking the partition structure; a simple live OS can expose remnants of other OS installations. If someone checks the boot logs or checks for filesystem traces, the dual-boot is an obvious giveaway. Even without sophisticated forensics, a simple inspection could reveal suspicious activity. You’re compromising your own security by trying to dual-boot on a system that’s already a surveillance target.

If anyone has any ideas or feedback please let me know. Regards

You need to rethink your entire approach to OPSEC, because your current setup is fundamentally flawed. Windows is your major problem, and no matter what you do with Puppy OS, VMs, or dual-booting, you’re not fixing the real weakness: the host OS.

Here’s what I recommend:
Use a separate, air-gapped system for anything related to your activities. This means no dual-booting, no running VMs on Windows. If you absolutely must, use a system like Tails OS (live USB) for high-risk activities, or Whonix in a VirtualBox setup on a non Windows host system. But remember, don’t do anything with your real identity on this system.

No dual-booting, no VMs, and especially no Windows for any activities that could compromise your privacy. Qubes OS is an option for compartmentalized security if you want to go the extra mile.

Physical access to your laptop is key. You can have a "Puppy" system, but only if your Windows is not compromised to begin with.

Consider using physical air gapped devices when necessary USB encryption is essential here.

Remember, your threat model is feds, and your current setup isn’t up to the task. Any time you rely on a Windows OS, you're essentially giving away your digital fingerprint without even realizing it.