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The goal of Tor Browser is to make every user have a fingerprint that is as close as possible to being the same. The reason that they don't want you messing with settings in about:config is that while you may think the changes you are making are increasing your anonymity, they are making you more unique.
All the fingerprinting methods make use of JS. If you have your safety settings turned up to max then scripts are blocked across all sites by default.
Modern JS fingerprinting libraries have a very robust assortment of methods that create a detailed fingerprint. Spoofing something like the user agent or the in-browser value for the OS is not going to do much when data points being gathered include things like the variance in performance timing due to OS task scheduling.
In the end the values you've provided are not going to match the data for the real OS, so now your fingerprint is incredibly unique because you don't match Tor Browser users or users of the actual OS.
Accessing sites using tor browser while allowing javascript to run with customized about:config settings, expecting to be able to effectively fool most of the JS fingerprinting libraries through the manual changes you've made is only going to make you extremely unique and your fingerprint hash is going to make you easily identifiable across browser sessions regardless of your IP.
If you want to access sites while allowing JS to run and hope to effectively spoof an operating system while also masking your IP and having a non-unique browser fingerprint, this is outside the scope of Tor Browser and what it's meant for.
