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Our latest tutorials on the opsec bible : OpSec | Torhoo darknet markets

Hi everyone, we've been quite busy the last few months, here are some of our latest tutorials that we recently merged into The Opsec Bible, don't hesitate to let us know if you guys find anything lacking in any of those, we'll schedule the fixes.

2025-07-09: Ensuring Your Privacy is Intact with OpenSnitch
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/opensnitch-firewall/

2025-07-07: Opsec Mistakes - The Downfall of Incognito Market
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/incognito_market/

2025-07-03: The postal system explained
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/thepostalsystemexplained/

2025-07-02: Fallacies used to dissuade you from using Freedom technology
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/0days-fallacy/

2025-06-29: The German and Netherlands Tor Nodes problem
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/germantornodes/

2025-06-26: Forgejo SimpleX Alerts (this one is really cool for our current project management)
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/forgejo-anon/

2025-06-22: GrapheneOS Duress PIN
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/duresspin/

2025-06-09: What's Agorism? (Contributed by https://torhoo.cc/go.php?u=TDNVdlpHOXBibWRtWldSMGFXMWw=#)
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/agorism/

2025-06-07: Anonymous Alerting System (via SimpleX)
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/simplexalerts/

2025-06-07: Stylometry Protection (Using Local LLMs) [old tutorial rewrite]
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/stylometry/

2025-05-26: The True Goal of Cryptocurrency
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/truecrypto/

2025-05-25: Why should I use Whonix for Self-hosted Hidden services ?
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/whonix_hiddenservice/

2025-05-16: Why can't I use signal to chat anonymously?
http://blog.nowherejezfoltodf4jiyl6r56jnzintap5vyjlia7fkirfsnfizflqd.onion/opsec/signalnoanonymity/

And yes, i'm paying XMR (from 0.0175 XMR for the simple tutorials to 0.1754 XMR for the complex ones) for people that can actually write some quality tutorials on opsec, dont hesitate to ping me on simplex if you're interested. I've already paid for 40-50 contributions so far, and yet we still have much more on the way.

We're also opening a new blogpost category called "opsec mistakes" where we will cover people that got busted because their opsec failed somewhere along the way, we're going to cover where exactly they failed (surveillance / KYC procedures / undeniability / identity segmentation contaminations, etc), with explanations as to what they could've done differently, which will help us reinforce our regular opsec advice tutorials going forward.

As usual, constructive criticism is welcome, cheers.
/u/Ghwbushsr
3 points
2 days ago
I like theGrapheneOS idea writing the pin on a piece of paper, to let LE put it in, thinking it's the actual pin LOL
/u/Yugong P I can move mountains ⛰️
2 points
2 days ago

1
Awards Received
Gold
1
Nice. I've approved the post.

I have a few comments. My first one is about the The German and Netherlands Tor Nodes problem article and some of its assumptions. Saying


Monero couldn't have been the source of their opsec mistakes, otherwise they and their users would have been arrested a long time ago
Tor couldn't have been the source of their opsec mistakes either, because otherwise the infrastructure would have been immediately taken down upon showing up and being on the cops' most wanted.

isn't based on anything but pure speculation. We've discussed this several times but not everything you read is how things are in reality. That especially applies to Tor and Monero.

You can find the references yourself on Dread and elsewhere but Monero isn't a magical solution. Millions of transactions to specific entity would provide much more information used to guesstimate with good accuracy the nature of transactions. The whole nature of Monero boils down to hiding with other inputs but when all the other inputs in that time frame would be yours, it defeats the purpose. Funny enough the Black Marble attack explains this very similar scenario.

Archetyp was a market whom displayed pre generated public addresses. Without a doubt that is something exchanges could see if users (buyers or vendors) were sending their XMR from exchange directly to any kind to those addresses, all conveniently starting with the same characters. That's why I and others have always said adding an extra hop (own Monero wallet) can prevent many of these issues.

If we talk on the network level running Monero service as market isn't easy either. Transactions need to be announced from certain nodes, certain IPs. While a few can be managed when we are talking about millions of transactions hiding it can be much more difficult. LE should be considered a global adversary evident by the amount of countries collaborating in the takedown of Archetyp. Given such identifying where transactions are announced from becomes a problem.

Tor on the other hand is for sure swiss cheese if comparing to Monero. I've explained in my posts /post/12b9f500f87bba5c3a0d and /post/5db0f0bba862e4c9a5fd that Tor entire model is defeated once countries start collaborating. As you pointed out rightfully so in your article majority of the Tor nodes are hosted within 14 eyes countries. When those countries collaborate, they can see where the traffic flows and can redirect, log it and much more. It isn't a Tor specific problem but an Internet one and one whom Tor inherits automatically. Being a low latency network doesn't help either and comes with its own challenges.

That's actually why mixnets is a good concept to be explored. NymVPN wouldn't be of my choice as they haven't matured first and second anyone who can read their whole can see their approach isn't built in with security. I certainly hope so that changes in the future.

LE don't need to instantly seize markets once they identify their infrastructure. Watching incoming and outgoing connections would hold more value as eventually they wish to identify admins and staff.

That's why both Monero and Tor could have very well played their own roles in the downfall of Archetyp.


but upon said 0day being revealed as such, the Tor developers fixed it afterward.

As I was writing this comment I remembered an interesting fact. Do you remember when a Tor developer was exposed for informing I believe it was the FBI of a Tor vulnerability BEFORE patching it? I wouldn't speak with such certainty on zero days of any nature being fixed quickly. I mean see RapTOR, years later nothing has been done.

On your Signal anonymity article. I agree with a lot of what was said on there. SimpleX has the same federated model as XMPP and that can be useful when having done the appropriate steps some of whom were listed in the article. I would like to add though Signal can be used entirely through a computer, no need for a smartphone at any stage and a number anyone can obtain easily for a one time SMS.
> isn't based on anything but pure speculation.

yea it is, but we have to wait until the court documents become public to clear this up, i'll add a disclaimer that this is speculation for now. (btw we have a git issue awaiting those court documents to effectively cover where exactly archetyp failed in their opsec)

> and a number anyone can obtain easily for a one time SMS.

yea that's the thing i covered in my on/offtopic guidelines for the opsec bible, in the case where there are a ton of possible options like for chat apps for instance, the on-topic solution should be the simplest option, for instance here with simplex you do away with the unecessary complexity of the phone number (which you can get anonymously with a SMS as a service, correct) it's just that one solution makes it simpler than the other, while also delivering opsec-wise.

regarding NymVPN, really their idea of making all traffic look the same is something i wish tor would implement, i feel like we shouldnt have to pay to get that feature, doesnt make sense to me. Ideally it shouldn't matter if an adversary runs the nodes you use, they shouldn't be able to correlate that that particular traffic is yours, and not bob's, all traffic shouldnt look different based on the timing, the size of the packets, it's all potential metadata that should be removed imo

i'll add a disclaimer that this is speculation for now.

Thanks that'd be nice.

I feel with the court documents released there's a high chance we won't get the full story. LE can say they discovered Archetyps admin by definitely randomly stopping his car and finding 50 euro note on the passenger seat and that's what started their suspicion and investigation. A long documented practice of police in most places around the world to do this and not reveal their true discovery method as they don't want their surveillance reach to be exposed publicly. Court cases exist where there would be refusal to prosecute only to save their methods for other targets.


that we recently merged into The Opsec Bible

I noticed only now you called it the OpSec Bible whom you are needless to say free to choose naming it. It should be noted regardless. Given on the differences of opinions (and ways to approach problems) expressed by contributing members here on more than few topicsm it's definitely a silly name to undertake and not sure it would qualify as a Bible in the sense Dread users would know it. Quite different to the approach the DNM Bible undertakes too.
i added the disclaimers rgd the speculations just now btw

As for the blog name how else would you name it ? i feel like the name is more catchy and memorable as it is right now, plus nobody chose that name yet afaik so i thought it'd be fine.
I hesitated to name it the opsec manual but that name was already taken by Mikoyan Gurevich's opsec blog so i didnt want to steal that name in particular.
/u/Demure
2 points
2 days ago
This is cool
/u/miner21 P
1 points
2 days ago
Thank you for all your work!!
/u/snowbunni P
1 points
2 days ago
miner! is this you?
/u/snowbunni P
1 points
2 days ago
Great post! Tysm! Crossposting on our subdread <3
/u/Reaps
1 points
2 days ago
thanks for everything you do boss. will check these out.
/u/Foo9eeng
1 points
2 days ago
interesting, thanks
Very helpful, thanks :)
Great info!
Thank you very much!

ss
/u/effective 🍼
1 points
1 day ago
Great post I upvoted!
/u/rmrf P
1 points
2 days ago
I am going to go through the list and review each source but I think this is a good effort.

I ask the community if there is value in someone as myself who is a database seller, and informed very well in the hacking community for a long time if it is better to write a guide on real opsec that deals with non drug user activity. I think there is a lot of overlap but many users seem to think that because they are casual users on this community they are safe.

Some of the issues I wish were discussed more were ISP's spying, companies like team cymru paying poor countries for all their pcap/netflow data to spy on people, and the overall state of spying that makes it difficult for anyone to remain anonymous forever. Too many of these posts are dealing with fringe ideas like style-listic matching of a person based on their writing but not on the overwhelming idea of nations getting together to correlate traffic to you. You can route your traffic through 10 network jumps but if all those routes are still correlated to countries that will work together you are doomed.

I appreciate the post I think it is great.