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Be aware that any defect sectors wil not be formated. Safest method is disk destruction.
The best thing OP could do to protect the data in the first place, is to encrypt the data while storing/using them (with a good passphrase of course). This would give some peace of mind whenever a later removal of the data is necessary and the drive itself needs to be reused.
If you need to get rid of the data permanently without a chance to recover them, snap it in half and proceed with an hammer.
Even if you "zero out" or use dd, most SSDs won’t touch overprovisioned or remapped sectors. That’s where the traces remain. Firmware level garbage collection makes it impossible to guarantee full wipe with software.
If threat level is high: physical destruction is the only option. Degaussing won’t help SSDs don’t store magnetically. Disassemble, shred the NAND chips, grind or use thermite.
If low threat: full disk encryption from day one, wipe keys, then low level overwrite. Not perfect, but viable.
1. Only trust FOSS software for deleting a SSD
2. Use native methods, users are about ensuring that data on the disk is erased, "unnecessary ware-leveling" does not matter, the storage must be erased.
3. By writing zeros and ones into the whole storage the probability for successful forensic analysis are significantly reduced.
4. The only 100% safe method is storage destruction
By using manufactory software there is no guarantees, nobody external has free access to the forensic labs where the truth are kept.
We're in agreement on point 4: destruction is the only 100% safe method. No debate there.
Regarding wear leveling: this isn’t about manufacturer software vs FOSS. It's about how SSD firmware handles writes at the controller level, even if you're using dd or open-source tools. Overprovisioned space and remapped sectors can be untouched, regardless of how many times you overwrite the drive, because the controller decides where data physically lands.
Yes, writing zeroes reduces recovery probability, but “significantly reduced” ≠ secure under high-threat. Agencies with advanced capabilities (think IC-level) have shown partial data recovery from NAND due to this.
If the threat model is moderate to high, software wipes are not enough. Full disk encryption + key destruction is viable at lower levels, but again only physical destruction guarantees data elimination.
Let’s keep it technical. If you’ve got evidence or sources showing full user level overwrite reliably reaches all NAND, I’d be genuinely interested.
Therefore use a FOSS solution and if still in doubts, use the manufactory software for a final erase.
This is solid, any storage "spill" will be more or less useless if it's encrypted.